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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
Because of the numerous issues encompassed under the topic of
criminal procedure, this article will discuss only a few subjects within
that broad topic, subjects that are in a developmental stage in the Tenth
Circuit. Many areas have been addressed by the court during this survey
period that will not be considered in this discussion, not because they
are not noteworthy or because changes or new precedent in these areas
have not been developed, but rather because they are not considered to
be among the major issues relevant to criminal procedure law.
This article will discuss the fine line distinguishing a Terry stop from
a full-fledged arrest, primarily in the context of a car search. The many
inroads to fourth amendment protections such as the exceptions of exi-
gency, independent source and attenuation will be considered, along
with the Tenth Circuit's strict compliance with a valid and knowing con-
sent to search. Next, this article will discuss the fifth amendment rights
of the accused, namely, what constitutes a waiver of those rights and the
consequences of counsel's comment on the defendant's invocation of
those rights as well as how privileges and immunities can operate to viti-
ate fifth amendment protections. Finally, issues arising out of the sixth
amendment protections will be discussed; for example: when a defend-
ant has the right to counsel; if the defendant has the right to counsel of
his choice; the sufficiency of a waiver of counsel; the collateral use of an
uncounseled conviction; and the right to effective assistance of counsel
in various contexts. There is also some commentary on the Tenth Cir-
cuit's treatment of the defendant's sixth amendment right to confront
his witnesses and the use of an absent witness's deposition at trial.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Car Searches: A Terry Stop Followed by Consent
1. United States v. Recalde
In United States v. Recalde,' an Argentinian citizen was stopped in
New Mexico for speeding. The officer testified at trial that because he
had a "gut instinct" that Recalde was transporting narcotics, 2 he asked
Recalde if he could look into the trunk of the car. Recalde immediately
obliged the officer. Upon inspecting the trunk, the officer spotted a
briefcase and asked if he could search its contents. Without hesitation,
Recalde consented to the search.3 The officer found nothing suspicious
in Recalde's trunk or brief-case, but did notice that a number of screws
in the automobile's interior had been tampered with. At this point, Re-
1. 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985).
2. Recatde, 761 F.2d at 1451.
3. Id. at 1452.
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calde was either asked or directed to accompany the officers to the po-
lice station for further investigation. 4 When they arrived at the station,
the officer gave Recalde his Miranda warnings and began to interrogate
him. Recalde indicated that he did not want to answer any questions,
but he agreed to sign a consent-to-search form and allowed the officers
to search his car. Upon searching the car, the officers discovered ten
kilograms of cocaine stashed inside the interior quarter panels, and, as a
result, the officer placed Recalde under arrest.5 Recalde was convicted
on one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. On appeal
to the Tenth Circuit, he argued that the district court erred in denying
his motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of his car.
6
In its response to the defendant's motion to suppress, which alleged
that the evidence seized from Recalde's car was based on an illegal
search, the prosecution did not rely on any of the exceptions to the war-
rant requirement, 7 such as a car search incident to an arrest,8 a personal
search incident to an arrest9 or exigent circumstances. 10 Instead, the
prosecution asserted the search was valid because Recalde had volunta-
rily signed a consent form at the police station. The prosecution alter-
natively argued that even if the court concluded that Recalde's consent
to accompany the police officers to the police station and his later con-
sent at the station to have his car searched was not entirely voluntary,
any intrusive invasions of privacy were justified as lawful measures taken
following a Teriy stop. " I
Judge Seymour, writing for a unanimous three judge panel, first de-
termined that the government had failed to establish that there was an
4. At trial, Recalde testified that he was ordered to accompany the officers to the
police station; conversely, the officers testified that they had merely asked Recalde to go
with them to the station. Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1452. Recalde was never told that he was
either free to go or free to refuse to accompany the officers to the police station. Neither
officer denied this. Furthermore, Recalde's undisputed testimony revealed that because
the officer had retained his driver's license and vehicle registration, he did not feel free to
leave at any time. The trial record also disclosed that when Recalde drove from the road-
side stop to the police station, his car was protectively sandwiched between the two of-
ficers' squad cars. Id.
5. Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1452.
6. Id. at 1451.
7. The seminal case requiring the issuance of a warrant before any search may be
conducted is Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
8. When the police make a lawful arrest of the occupants of an automobile, they may
also search the car's passenger compartment without obtaining a warrant. See New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
9. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In Chimel, the Court held that "[w]hen
an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested...
[without obtaining a warrant]." Id. at 762-63.
10. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (contraband hidden in the seats of a
car was validly seized by an arresting officer without a warrant because it was in the control
of one who was legally arrested).
11. Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1454. In Terry v. Ohio, 342 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States
Supreme Court permitted police officers to conduct a limited search of an individual based
on less than probable cause, provided the police officer has an articulable basis for sus-
pecting criminal activity. See also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (extending
the Terry search to allow a search for weapons in an automobile's passenger compartment
based on less than probable cause).
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absence of duress or coercion when the officers obtained Recalde's con-
sent. Judge Seymour gleaned from the testimony that Recalde per-
ceived himself to be in a coercive custodial situation in which he had no
other option but to comply with the officers' requests.' 2 Following
United States v. Mendenhall,13 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,14 and United States
v. Prichard,15 the Tenth Circuit held that "consent" is a question of fact
to be determined from the totality of the circumstances.' 6 The trial
court must determine whether the consent is in fact voluntary, or the
product of some form of duress or coercion. The burden is on the gov-
ernment to prove an absence of duress or coercion, and, if the "con-
sent" is given after an illegal stop, the government has an even heavier
burden of proof to carry than it would if the consent had been given
after a permissible stop.'
7
The Tenth Circuit found that the government in Recalde was unable
to meet its weighty burden to refute duress or coercion; therefore, the
transport of the defendant to the station exceeded the scope and reason-
ableness of a Terry stop. The record divulged not only that the officer
retained Recalde's driver's license and vehicle registration at all times
prior to the car search, but also that Recalde had signed the consent
form only moments after being placed in a small interrogation room
with two police officers.' 8 These facts substantiated the court's conclu-
sion that Recalde had perceived himself to be in a coercive custodial
situation.
Because the Tenth Circuit concluded that the government was un-
able to sustain its burden to refute the existence of duress or coercion, it
turned to the prosecution's alternative contention that these actions
were permissible and reasonable because they were proper precaution-
ary measures following a Terry stop. In analyzing the validity of the in-
vestigative roadside stop, the Tenth Circuit looked to see if the officer's
actions were justified at the inception of the stop and whether the extent
of the officer's actions were reasonably related in scope to the circum-
stances which justified the initial interference. 19 Judge Seymour stated
that the court's assessment is essentially a balancing test which weighs
12. Id. But cf. United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir. 1984) (The
defendant testified that he told the officer he could search his car "because that way I felt
he would let me go or something." The Tenth Circuit in Obregon found that the record
amply supported the district court's decision that the defendant had voluntary consented
to the car search despite the defendant's perception of a coercive situation.). See infra
notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
13. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
14. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
15. 645 F.2d 854 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981).
16. See also United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1376 (1984) (Given the totality
of the circumstances, the defendant, who had stated he did not want to make a statement
and wanted to see a lawyer, made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights by signing
a consent form.).
17. Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1457 (citing United States v. Troutman, 590 F.2d 604, 606
(5th Cir. 1979) and United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 916 (5th Cir. 1978)).
18. Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1454.
19. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968) and United States v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct.
1568 (1985)); see also United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371 (10th Cir. 1984).
1986]
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the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's fourth amend-
ment interests against the importance of the governmental interests al-
leged to justify the intrusion.20 The court conceded that the initial stop
and the subsequent demand for Recalde to display his driver's license
and vehicle registration were reasonable and minimally intrusive be-
cause he was driving in excess of the maximum speed limits. It further
found that Recalde's consent to search the trunk of his car and his brief-
case was entirely voluntary under the circumstances. On the other hand,
when Recalde was "persuaded" to accompany the police officers to the
station, the court concluded that the officers had crossed over the line of
reasonableness and converted their investigative Terry stop into an
arrest, requiring a threshold of probable cause which the court deter-
mined had not been met.
2 1
Judge Seymour relied on Dunaway v. New York 2 2 and Hayes v. Flor-
ida.23 Hayes describes the line separating a brief detention and a full
fledged arrest to be "[w]hen the police ...forcibly remove a person
from his home [or other place in which he is entitled to be] and trans-
port him to [a police] station, where he is detained, although briefly, for
investigative purposes ..... -24 Accordingly, in moving and subse-
quently detaining Recalde, involuntarily and without probable cause,
the policemen had exceeded the limits of a Terry stop and violated Re-
calde's fourth amendment rights. Therefore, the evidence, ten kilo-
grams of cocaine found in the search, was properly suppressed.
25
2. United States v. Gonzalez
Two weeks after the Tenth Circuit handed down the Recalde opin-
ion, it considered United States v. Gonzalez, 26 a case involving an almost
identical factual situation as that in Recalde. Gonzalez was driving down
a New Mexico highway and was pulled over for speeding. Here again,
the officer testified to having a "gut feeling" or intuition that the defend-
ant was transporting narcotics; this was partly because the officer had
smelled deodorizer in the car, a tactic often used to mask the scent of
narcotics.2 7 Nevertheless, the officer could not articulate with any de-
gree of specificity what facts could give rise to justify a search, the mini-
mum requirement laid down in Terry.
Once stopped, Gonzalez was asked to produce his driver's license
and vehicle registration. When the officer saw that Gonzalez's driver's
20. " 'When the nature and extent of the detention are minimally intrusive of the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests, the opposing law enforcement interests can sup-
port a seizure on less than probable cause.' " Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1454 (quoting United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)) (emphasis omitted).
21. Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1455.
22. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
23. 105 S. Ct. 1643 (1985).
24. Id. at 1644. See generally Y. KAMISAR, W. LA FAVE, J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 256-415 (4th ed. 1974).
25. Recalde, 761 at 1459.
26. 763 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1985).
27. Id. at 1128.
346 [Vol. 63:2
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license was from New York but the car was registered in California, he
became suspicious that the vehicle was stolen. The officer returned to
his own vehicle and conducted a computer check to verify the propriety
of the registration and license. Although the computer check disclosed
that no problems existed, the officer's suspicions of criminal activity still
remained. At this point, the officer requested that the defendant accom-
pany him to the police station for further interrogation. 2 8 Once at the
station, the officer promptly prepared a speeding citation along with a
consent-to-search form, both of which the defendant signed. The car
search uncovered eighty pounds of cocaine underneath the back seat
and within the side door panels. The defendant was immediately placed
under arrest.
2 9
The Tenth Circuit's rationale and conclusion in Gonzalez was similar
to that in Recalde: the court explained that the officer, once he trans-
ported Gonzalez from the side of the highway to the police station, had
stepped over the line separating the minimally intrusive actions permit-
ted in a Terry stop into the realm of a full-fledged arrest necessitating
probable cause. Because there was no probable cause to arrest the de-
fendant, the officer had clearly invaded Gonzalez's constitutionally pro-
tected right against unlawful searches and seizures. The government
had, as in Recalde, failed to overcome its burden to prove that, under the
circumstances, Gonzalez had been free from coercion or duress when he
signed the consent-to-search form.
An interesting point made by Judge Logan in his analysis of the
illegal roadside seizure was that the length of time that Gonzalez was
detained, twenty minutes, was only minimally intrusive and that this, if
standing alone, was reasonable.3 0 He acknowledged that if United States
v. Sharpe3 l was relied upon to determine whether this was an illegal
seizure, the twenty minute stop would pass constitutional muster. It was
not, however, the brevity of the detention that the court was concerned
with; rather, it was the conduct of the officer during the detention that
became the decisive factor in the constitutional assessment. The court
therefore looked to Hayes v. Florida3 2 where the focus was on the police
conduct during the stop, not the duration of the stop itself. The Hayes
Court announced that the proper inquiry is whether the defendant has
perceived, either implicitly or explicitly, a loss of freedom when taken
from his house to a police station and detained against his will.3 3 The
Tenth Circuit accepted the district court's finding that Gonzalez had
perceived that there was no option other than to accompany the officer,
no matter how polite the officer was in phrasing his request. Just as in
28. Gonzalez, 763 F.2d at 1129-30.
29. Id. at 1129.
30. Id. at 1131.
31. 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985) ("In assessing whether a detention is too long in
duration to be justified as an investigative stop .... it [is] appropriate to examine whether
the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel
their suspicions quickly .... ).
32. 105 S. Ct. 1643 (1985).
33. Id. at 1647.
19861
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Recalde, the officer had retained the defendant's driver's license and ve-
hicle registration. Because the officers lacked sufficient probable cause
to justify a full-fledged arrest, the court concluded that Gonzalez' trip to
the station was a clear violation of his fourth amendment rights.
34
Judge Logan noted that the officer detaining Gonzalez had reason-
able alternatives to a forced trip to the police station. The officer could
have requested a backup officer,3 5 or he could have attempted to obtain
a consent to search the vehicle on the spot. 3 6 Additionally, as the
Supreme Court noted in Michigan v. Long,3 7 if there are reasonable and
articulable grounds for a belief that the suspect is dangerous and that he
may gain immediate control of any weapons, the officer may conduct a
brief search of the automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon
may be placed or hidden. 38 The Long holding is similar to the Tenth
Circuit opinion of United States v. Romero, 39 decided prior to Long. The
Romero decision held that just as an officer may search a car for weapons
during a lawful arrest,40 an officer who has lawfully stopped a suspect
whom he reasonably believes is armed and dangerous may conduct a
limited search of the suspect's car.
4 1
Romero also was important because it followed the Tenth Circuit
precedent4 2 that adopted the "independent source" exception to the
exclusionary rule. This exception, carved out in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States,4 3 recognized that the "fruits of the poisonous tree ''4 4 doc-
trine would not apply where the evidence obtained could have come
from two sources, one of which was legitimate. The Silverthorne Court
stated that evidence obtained through illegal searches does not automat-
ically become sacred and insulated from the judicial process; if the gov-
ernment can prove that the evidence was obtainable from an
independent and constitutionally permissible source, it will be
admissible.
4 5
34. Gonzalez, 763 F.2d at 1133.
35. The atmosphere of the detention appeared threatening to the officer. It was dark
outside; the stop occurred on an isolated stretch of highway; and, furthermore, there were
two occupants inside the vehicle and only one officer at the scene. Id. at 1132.
36. Id. at 1133.
37. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); see supra note 11.
38. Long, 463 U.S. at 1049.
39. 692 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1982).
40. Id. at 703; see infra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
41. Romero, 692 F.2d at 703; see also United States v. Pappas, 735 F.2d 1232 (10th Cir.
1984) (limited car search for weapons conducted immediately after defendant's arrest for
protective measures was not a violation of the fourth amendment).
42. See Aiuppa v. United States, 393 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
871 (1971).
43. 251 U.S. 395 (1920).
44. In Wong Sung v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the Supreme Court held that
any evidence obtained directly or indirectly as a result of illegal police conduct will be
suppressed.
45. Silverthornes holding did not explicitly go quite this far, but later decisions have
confirmed its broad application. In Segura v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984), the
police entered the defendant's apartment without first obtaining a search warrant. The
Court permitted this unlawful entry because at the time of the entry, the officers already
had the requisite probable cause they would have needed to obtain a search warrant. Ex-
[Vol. 63:2
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The court in Gonzalez excluded the evidence found in the car search
labeling it "tainted fruit" from an illegal seizure.4 6 If the government
had argued that a limited Romero search of the car's passenger compart-
ment based upon articulable facts would have unearthed the cocaine
hidden beneath the back seat, and alleged that this limited search was a
legal and "independent" source of discovery of the evidence, 4 7 the
eighty pounds may have withstood the motion to suppress. The govern-
ment, however, instead alleged that when Gonzalez voluntarily con-
sented to have his car searched, he "purged the taint" 4 8 of the illegal
stop, cleansing the otherwise defective subsequent seizure of evidence
of any constitutional violations.
The Supreme Court has recognized several situations where a vic-
tim of illegal police conduct cannot use the exclusionary rule to sup-
press evidence. One such situation is when there is sufficient
attenuation between the illegal stop and a consent to search. This "at-
tenuation" doctrine was recently adopted by the Tenth Circuit in United
States v. Carson.49 In Carson, the court held that the evidence found in a
second search was admissible because the defendant's voluntary consent
to the second search was an independent act sufficient to break the
causal connection between the illegal first search and the second
search. 50 Notwithstanding the Carson opinion, the Gonzalez court, based
on the facts, could not find sufficient attenuation to justify the admission
of evidence found in a search preceded by an illegal detention.5 '
In Gonzalez, ChiefJudge Holloway dissented in a lengthy opinion in
which he admonished the majority for failing to adequately protect the
clusion of the evidence as "fruit of the poisonous tree," explained the Court, is not war-
ranted due to that independent source. In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the
officers were not entitled to enter Payton's home without a warrant in the absence of exi-
gent circumstances. However, the officers did have probable cause to obtain an arrest
warrant for Payton, and this probable cause furnished an "independent source" permit-
ting the warrantless search and seizure of the narcotics that were in plain view in Payton's
apartment.
46. Gonzalez, 763 F.2d at 1133.
47. Had the officer been alert enough to conduct a limited Romero search for weapons
and chanced to stumble upon the narcotics during this search, he could have seized the
cocaine under the "plain view" doctrine, an independent and legitimate source of discov-
ery. The Tenth Circuit adopted the United States Supreme Court's "plain view" doctrine,
announced in Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968), in United States v. Merryman,
630 F.2d 780, 782 (10th Cir. 1980). Merryman discusses the "plain view" doctrine in terms
of not requiring the officers to "close their eyes" if they run across evidence of other
crimes while conducting a limited Tery search. See also United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d
1371, 1376 (10th Cir. 1984) ("If, in the process of so doing, the officers saw evidence of
other crimes, they had the right to take reasonable investigative steps and were not re-
quired to close their eyes." (quoting Merryman, 630 F.2d at 782-85)) (emphasis omitted).
48. The principle of the "purged taint" doctrine is that if enough additional factors
intervene between the original illegality of the search and the final discovery of evidence,
then neither the "deterrence" nor the "judicial fairness" rationale behind the exclusionary
rule apply. Therefore, the evidence may be admissible despite the fact that it would not
have been discovered "but for" the illegality. See Wong Sung v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 484-88 (1963).
49. 762 F.2d 833 (10th Cir. 1985).
50. Carson, 762 F.2d at 836 (citing United States v. Fike, 449 F.2d 191, 193 (5th Cir.
1971)).
51. Gonzalez, 763 F.2d at 1133.
1986]
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governmental interests of crime prevention and police protection.
Judge Holloway advocated the use of a balancing test that would weigh a
limited violation of an individual's privacy interests against the govern-
mental interests in protecting the police officer's safety and preventing
and detecting crime. 52 He distinguished the facts in Hayes, the decision
most heavily relied upon by the majority, and noted that even this deci-
sion recognized that exigent circumstances may justify a trip to the po-
lice station. He additionally emphasized the importance of a court's
consideration of "the totality of the circumstances," rejecting a reading
of Hayes that would cause any move to a police station for investigative
purposes, unless justified by probable cause, to be in violation of an
individual's fourth amendment rights. 53 Judge Holloway's argument for
compassion towards police officers in their attempts to combat crime
and his attempt to give them more discretion and power to effectuate
their "gut feelings" or "intuitions" does not seem to have gained much
acceptance in view of the majority opinions in the cases decided in the
Tenth Circuit during this survey period.
It appears that the Tenth Circuit is becoming increasingly sympa-
thetic to individual rights where no probable cause exists to search the
defendant or his car and a consent to search is not voluntarily given.
The evidence was suppressed in three of the cases discussed, 54 Recalde,
Gonzalez, and Carson, but not in one case, United States v. Obregon.
5 5
Obregon can be distinguished from the other three because the initial
stop and subsequent detention were lawful, and, in addition, Obregon
gave his consent to search his car within minutes of the initial stop.
5 6
After looking at the "totality of the circumstances," the court found that
the trial court's record amply supported a finding that Obregon's con-
sent was devoid of any coercion or duress and accordingly held that no
constitutional rights had been breached.
5 7
Despite an apparent censure of police power in the area of fourth
amendment rights, the Tenth Circuit has left a few doors open for police
officers suspicious of criminal activity. The law enforcement officer can
first attempt to gain the suspect's voluntary consent to a roadside search
of his vehicle. He may also lawfully conduct a limited search of the
passenger compartment of the vehicle under Romero5 8 if he has a rea-
sonably articulable suspicion of criminal activity. At this point, he may
seize any evidence of another crime he may happen to "stumble upon"
during his limited weapons search. 59 This limited search could likely
unearth evidence that could be used to form the basis of probable cause,
thus enabling the officer to proceed with a full-fledged Belton search. 60
52. Id. at 1135 (Holloway, C.J., dissenting)
53. Id. at 1135-37 (Holloway, C.J., dissenting).
54. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
55. 748 F.2d 1371 (10th Cir. 1984).
56. Id. at 1376.
57. Id.
58. 692 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1982).
59. See supra note 47.
60. See infra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
350 [Vol. 63:2
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B. Car Search Incident to Arrest: The Belton Rule
1. United States v. Cotton
In United States v. Cotton,6 1 the Tenth Circuit adopted the United
States Supreme Court's holding in New York v. Belton, 62 which declared
that when the police make a lawful "custodial arrest" 6 3 of the occupant
of an automobile, they may, incident to that arrest, conduct a search of
the entire passenger compartment of the vehicle, including any interior
compartments or contents of any containers.64 The rationale for the
Belton decision was to protect and ensure the safety of the officers and to
prevent the destruction of evidence - the very reasons the Supreme
Court in Chimel v. California 65 allowed a warrantless search of an arrestee
and the area within his immediate control. The defendant in Cotton ar-
gued that the Belton opinion should not apply because he was hand-
cuffed outside his car, thereby eliminating the danger that he could have
reached into his car and grabbed a weapon. 66 The court was not per-
suaded by this argument and instead adopted a per se permissible "car
search incident to arrest" that does not require the arresting officer to
undergo any analysis whatsoever to determine whether the arrestee
could or could not reach into the car and grab a weapon or destroy some
evidence.6 7 This "bright line" rule, contended the court, does not oper-
ate to promote police misconduct that may result in violations of the
fourth amendment. The court reasoned that an individual has a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy in an automobile and that relaxation of the
exclusionary rule is therefore appropriate in this context.6 8 The court
seemed to sympathize with the police officers' need for some concrete
guidelines in their efforts to protect themselves and to prevent the de-
struction of evidence.
61. 751 F.2d 1146 (10th Cir. 1985).
62. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
63. This is to be distinguished from a Tery stop for non-custodial traffic violations
such as speeding, registration checks and defective vehicle stops.
64. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. This holding limits the search to the inside of the passen-
ger compartment only. The Belton rule does not permit a search of the trunk of the auto-
mobile incident to a custodial arrest. The theory behind this exception derives from the
fact that the trunk will be inaccessible to the suspect once he is apprehended. However, if
there is probable cause to search the car and the trunk, this may be permissible without a
warrant pursuant to the general "automobile exception." See, e.g., United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798 (1982) (because police had lawfully stopped automobile and had probable
cause to believe contraband was contained therein, they could conduct a thorough war-
rantless search). But see United States v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. 1568 (1985). See generally Al-
pert & Haas, Judicial Rulemaking and the Fourth Amendment: Cars, Containers and Exclusionary
Justice, 35 ALA. L. REV. 23 (1984) (providing an analysis of the Supreme Court's opaque
interpretation of the fourth amendment and the concomitant effect ofjudicial rulemaking
which attempts to achieve more clarity in ambiguous situations); Note, Privacy Rights v. Law
Enforcement Difficulties: The Clash of Competing Interests in New York v. Belton, 59 DEN. L.J. 793
(1982) (discussing the development of justifications for a permissible search incident to
arrest with respect to the individual's privacy interest balanced against the government's
interest in law enforcement).
65. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
66. Cotton, 751 F.2d at 1148.
67. Id. at 1149.
68. Id.
1986]
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It is interesting to note that the Cotton court adopts a "bright line"
rule, but then qualifies its holding. The court instructs the officers to
always consider the "totality of circumstances" before acting.
69
Although it appears that this opinion was intended to create an absolute
rule, a fairer analysis may be that the Tenth Circuit is attempting to for-
mulate a "workable" rule whereby the officer can have more discretion
when making a decision concerning his safety and the preservation of
evidence.
2. United States v. Pappas
In United States v. Pappas,70 the Tenth Circuit upheld a limited car
search incident to arrest which uncovered a loaded hand-gun despite
conflicting testimony as to whether or not the defendant was in his car at
the time of his arrest. 7 1 After discovering the hand-gun in the initial
search of the car, the arresting officer impounded the car and conducted
a full-blown inventory search. 72 Looking to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in South Dakota v. Oppernan73 for guidance, the court found there
was no justifiable reason for the car's impoundment and subsequent in-
ventory search. 7 4 Because the officer exceeded the permissible scope of
a Belton search when he transported the suspect's vehicle to the police
station, the illegal sawed-off shotgun found underneath the seat of the
defendant's car during the inventory search was suppressed. This case
is significant in that it acknowledged that a Belton search incident to
arrest was permissible, but once the officer impounded the vehicle and
looked in the trunk, he violated the defendant's fourth amendment
rights.
C. Warrantless Car Searches: United States v. Swingler
The issue of whether a car search incident to an arrest based on
probable cause requires a warrant was addressed in United States v. Swin-
gler.75 In Swingler, arrests of four defendants were made based upon
69. "The act of the officer in seizing the bank bag under the totality of circumstances
presented here was therefore reasonable." Cotton, 751 F.2d at 1149 (emphasis added).
"Upon an examination of the facts of each case, the court need do no more than examine the
reasonableness of the officer's actions under the totality of the circumstances and in view of the
above-stated concerns." Id. at 1150 (emphasis added).
70. 735 F.2d 1232 (10th Cir. 1984).
71. Under a Belton search, only the passenger compartment may be searched if a de-
fendant is placed under arrest while in the vehicle. See supra note 64 and accompanying
text.
72. Pappas, 735 F.2d at 1233.
73. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
74. Pappas, 735 F.2d at 1234. Opperman set forth three situations in which an im-
poundment and a subsequent inventory search of a car is constitutionally permissible: 1)
to protect the owner's property in police custody; 2) to protect the police against claims of
lost or stolen property; or 3) to protect police from potential danger. Opperman, 428 U.S.
at 369.
75. 758 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1985). This case also addressed the amount and quality
of information necessary for probable cause to make a warrantless search. In Wyoming,
the state in which the crimes in Swingler took place, the courts and legislature have adopted
the "totality of the circumstances" test established in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)
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probable cause and in three of those instances, warrantless searches
were conducted of the cars being driven by the defendants. Those
searches revealed controlled substances and various paraphenalia used
in the production of those substances. 7 6 After holding that there was
sufficient probable cause to make the arrests, the Tenth Circuit, Judge
Bohanon writing,7 7 decided whether the searches and seizures of these
suspects and vehicles could take place without a warrant. The Tenth
Circuit cited to Carroll v. United States 78 and United States v. Ross,7 9 the two
landmark cases that carved out the "automobile exception" to the gen-
eral rule requiring a warrant before any search is conducted. 80 The
Supreme Court in Carroll announced that the police may search a vehicle
without a warrant if such search is necessary to preserve evidence, as will
be the case when the car can be quickly driven out of the jurisdiction. 8 1
This exception is known as "exigent circumstances." The Ross decision
later clarified the extent of such a search. In this case, the Court sanc-
tioned a warrantless search of the vehicle, and stated that the scope of
such a search could be "no broader and no narrower" than one ap-
proved by a magistrate. Thus, every part of the vehicle or its contents,
where contraband might be stored, could be inspected. 82 The Court
explained that "t]he scope of a warrantless search of an automobile
thus is not defined by the nature of the container in which the contra-
band is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of the search and the
places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be
found."' 83 Thus, if the officers have probable cause to search a vehicle,
they may do so without a warrant.
The defendants in Swingler argued that this Carroll/Ross automobile
exception applies only when there are exigent circumstances. They as-
serted that in their case, the officers should have obtained a warrant
prior to searching their automobiles because the officers knew the de-
scription and make of the suspected vehicles far enough in advance to
obtain a warrant. Judge Bohanon rejected this contention noting that
the Supreme Court has never endorsed the view that the automobile
to evaluate the adequacy of information received and used to constitute probable cause for
a warrantless search. See Bonsness v. Wyoming, 672 P.2d 1291, 1293 (Wyo. 1983); Wvo.
STAT. § 7-2-103 (1977). In Swingler, the informant's information was mainly hearsay ac-
quired through her husband. Independently, however, the informant was found to be
trustworthy, and her testimony was corroborated and uncontradicted by further police
investigations. The court thus concluded that by looking at the "totality of the circum-
stances," the information was not disqualified as a valid source of probable cause, and the
subsequent warrantless search of the car was proper. Swingler, 758 F.2d at 487.
76. Swingler, 758 F.2d at 484-86.
77. Judge Bohanon of the United States District Court for the Northern, Eastern and
Western Districts of Oklahoma sat by designation.
78. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
79. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
80. The case requiring a warrant before a search is Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
81. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162.
82. Ross, 456 U.S. at 825.
83. Id. at 824.
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exception applies only in situations involving exigent circumstances. 8 4
Thus, the Tenth Circuit abandoned any exigency requirement for war-
rantless car searches and will not require the issuance of a warrant for an
inventory search when a car is seized under the newly expanded Car-
roll/Ross exception.
Looking to the Supreme Court case law defining the elements re-
quired under a Carroll/Ross car exception, the holding in Swingler ap-
pears to be unjustified because of the Tenth Circuit's failure to require
exigent circumstances. An argument can be made that in future cases,
the Tenth Circuit's abandonment of the exigency requirement should
not be applied to the Carroll/Ross exception. On the other hand, it
would not be unreasonable to assume that the Swingler opinion has dras-
tically broadened the scope of the Carroll/Ross exception by throwing
out exigency as a requirement. If future decisions accept this interpreta-




The Supreme Court has ruled that after being advised of his Mi-
randa rights, an accused may validly waive his right against self incrimi-
nation and respond to police interrogation.8 5 The Court has stressed,
however, that the prosecution bears a heavy burden to demonstrate a
knowing and intelligent waiver which cannot be presumed merely from
the fact that the defendant was advised of his rights.86 On the other
hand, the accused need not expressly state that he wishes to waive his
rights; a waiver can be inferred from the fact that he voluntarily an-
swered questions after receiving the Miranda warnings, provided the
court is satisfied that the defendant was fully aware of the relevant cir-
cumstances and likely consequences when he volunteered
information.
8 7
1. Fernandez v. Rodriguez
In Fernandez v. Rodriguez88 the defendant, Fernandez, was initially
charged with voluntary manslaughter, and entered into a stipulation
with the state wherein he agreed to submit to a polygraph examination.
This agreement provided that the results of the test would be admissible
in court. Fernandez was unable to speak and understand the English
language fluently, and testified that he did not understand the stipula-
84. Swingler, 758 F.2d at 489-90 (citing Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261
(1982)). The Carroll/Ross automobile exception is not dependent on the mobility or im-
mobility of the vehicle and does not depend on the likelihood that the evidence within the
automobile would be tampered with during the period of time that it would take for the
police to secure a search warrant.
85. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
86. Tague v. Louisiana, 440 U.S. 469 (1980).
87. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
88. 761 F.2d 558 (10th Cir. 1985).
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tion he signed, or the polygraph test itself. In addition, he testified that
his attorney never warned him that the results of the polygraph could be
used against him; to the contrary, he alleged that his attorney led him to
believe that it was a routine and mandatory test.8 9 Following the poly-
graph examination, the prosecution filed a more serious.charge of mur-
der with firearm enhancement. Fernandez's attorney then withdrew
from the case and public defenders were appointed, who immediately
filed a motion to suppress the results of the polygraph examination.
Following a hearing, the trial court found that the defendant adequately
understood the polygraph stipulation and concluded that a valid waiver
of his right to remain silent was given.9 0
The Tenth Circuit, Judge Doyle writing, remarked on the over-
whelming amount of evidence in Fernandez's favor and did not hesitate
to reverse the trial court's holding. "Unquestionably the defendant
made his decision to sign the polygraph stipulation without knowing
that he was thereby convicting himself; with the advice of his then coun-
sel." 9 1 The primary reason the court decided that Fernandez had not
given a knowing and intelligent waiver was due to his meager grasp of
the English language. Had he understood the significance of the poly-
graph test, the court explained, he would not have agreed to participate.
Judge Doyle stated that under such circumstances, "it was imperative
that his attorney explain to him the possible consequences . . ." and he
did not.9 2 As a result, the court stated that the totality of the circum-
stances indicated that Fernandez did not comprehend the consequences
of the stipulation, and found the district court's conclusion to be clearly
erroneous.
B. Courtroom Comment on the Right of Silence
1. Velarde v. Shulsen
Just as the right to remain silent has been given a high degree of
protection by the judiciary, the courts have also safeguarded a defend-
ant's right to be free from any comment to the jury or judge about his
invocation of his fifth amendment privilege to remain silent.9 3 Although
there have been several cases in this survey period that have not found
such a violation to be reversible error,9 4 the latest such decision, Velarde
v. Shulsen,9 5 reversed the lower court's decision and found that com-
ments made regarding the defendant's silence resulted in harmful con-
stitutional error.
In Velarde, the prosecutor engaged in questioning designed to call
attention to the fact that the defendant, Velarde, did not make any ex-
89. Id. at 560.
90. Id. at 560-61.
91. d. at 561.
92. Id.
93. For a textual discussion of the right of the accused not to testify, seeJ. SCARBORO
&J. WHITE, CONsTrruTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 464-613 (1977), 97-123 (Supp. 1980).
94. See infra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
95. 757 F.2d 1093 (10th Cir. 1985).
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culpatory statements at the time of his arrest. This was, in effect, an
inquiry into the defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda warning silence.
There were repeated defense counsel objections to this line of question-
ing, but the magistrate overruled those objections. Later, the magistrate
acknowledged that certain portions of the prosecutor's examination
were constitutional error, but concluded that this error was harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
9 6
The Tenth Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, agreed that there was
constitutional error specifically prohibited by the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, and relied on Doyle v. Ohio9 7 in determining that the pros-
ecutor's comments violated Velarde's right to remain silent. The
Supreme Court in Doyle held:
[W]hile it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express
assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is
implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such cir-
cumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation
of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used
to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. 9 8
Once the Tenth Circuit decided that the comments violated Ve-
larde's due process rights, it turned to the next issue: Did the prosecu-
tor's questions and remarks constitute harmless error beyond a
reasonable doubt?99 In 1984, the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Bar-
ton,' 0 0 ruled that once a court finds a constitutional error of this nature,
the government has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the comments made with regard to the defendant's silence were
harmless'10 1 In Velarde the prosecution's case was entirely circumstan-
tial, and much turned on the jury's evaluation of Velarde's credibility.
Citing United States v. Polsinelli,10 2 the court decided that because the de-
fendant's credibility was a pivitol issue in the case, the government had
not met the required burden of proof.
2. United States v. Cotton
The Tenth Circuit, though watchful and protective of the criminal
defendant's constitutional rights, will not uphold those interests without
justification. In United States v. Cotton,103 Judge Finesilver, writing for a
unanimous three judge panel, held that an attempt by the prosecutor to
comment on the defendant's right to remain silent was not reversible
error because defense counsel was quick to interpose an objection to
96. Id. at 1095.
97. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
98. Id. at 618.
99. Velarde, 757 F.2d at 1095.
100. 731 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1984).
101. Id. at 675.
102. 649 F.2d 793, 798 (10th Cir. 1981). See also United States v. Johnson, 495 F.2d
242, 246 n.5 (10th Cir. 1974) (If the very essence of the case is the jurors' assessement of
the witness' credibility, the admission of tainted evidence cannot be considered harmless.).
103. 751 F.2d 1146 (10th Cir. 1985). Judge Finesilver of the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado sat by designation.
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the unconstitutional line of questioning. 10 4 The court also pointed out
that the defense counsel requested, and the court gave, an immediate
admonition to the jury, thus curing any potential problem raised.
0 5
3. United States v. Swingler
Reluctance to find reversible error without reasonable basis is also
evident in United States v. Swingler.10 6 In this case, the defense counsel
inadvertently elicited testimony from a government witness regarding the
defendant's silence upon arrest. Although he did not object or move to
strike the testimony, defense counsel immediately minimized its effect
by more artfully rephrasing his question. The Tenth Circuit, Judge
Bohanon writing, 10 7 concluded that because the witness had not in-
tended to comment improperly on defendant's right to remain silent
and any prejudice was "ameliorated by the succeeding questions and
answers," any error was harmless.' 0 8
C. Privilege, Immunity, and the Fifth Amendment
1. The Marital Privilege
The confidentiality of spousal communications has been safe-
guarded in the courtroom because the judiciary is in favor of fostering
family peace and promoting marital harmony. This privilege, however,
is not absolute. The Tenth Circuit has recognized at least two excep-
tions and discussed them in two opinions handed down during the sur-
vey period and authored by Judge Barrett.
In United States v. Kapnison,10 9 the defendant's wife was granted im-
munity1 1 0 from prosecution by the government and was willing to testify
against her husband. Kapnison, the defendant-husband, alleged that his
wife's voluntary cooperation with the government and her testimonial
104. Cotton, 751 F.2d at 1150.
105. Id.
106. 758 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1985).
107. Judge Bohanon of the United States District Court for the Eastern and Western
Districts of Oklahoma sat by designation.
108. Swingler, 758 F.2d at 500.
109. 743 F.2d 1450 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2017 (1985).
110. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982), the privilege against self-incrimination does
not provide total immunity for a witness who does not want to testify. The statute pro-
vides in pertinent part:
Immunity Generally
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary
to -
1) a court or grand jury of the United States ...
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an
order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the
basis of his privilege against setf-incrimination; but no testimony or other information
compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from
such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any crim-
inal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise
failing to comply with the order.
Id. (emphasis added).
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appearances before the grand jury and the trial jury were in violation of
his fifth and sixth amendment rights. Quoting extensively from Trammell
v. United States,' the Tenth Circuit held that the marital privilege
should be circumscribed so that only the witness-spouse has the privi-
lege to refuse or agree to testify adversely concerning his or her
spouse's affairs; the witness-spouse may not be compelled or foreclosed
from testifying by the other spouse. 1 2 This modification of the marital
privilege does not promote a deterioration of the family unit because if
one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a criminal proceed-
ing, their relationship is almost certainly in a state of disrepair. In addi-
tion, a two-sided marital privilege could actually operate to undermine
the marital relationship. The state would be reluctant to grant immunity
to a spouse if it knew her spouse could prevent her from giving adverse
testimony; thus the privilege could have the unfortunate effect of per-
mitting one spouse to escape prosecution at the expense of the other.
The Supreme Court thus concluded in Trammell, and the Tenth Circuit
agreed in Kapnison, that the newly defined marital privilege continues to
further the important public interest of the spousal relationship without
unduly burdening legitimate state interests.'
13
The Kapnison opinion is unclear in desribng the precise nature and
extent of the testimony that one spouse can volunteer in court against
the other uncooperative spouse based on this "modified" privilege
alone. When Mr. Kapnison objected to testimony relating to informa-
tion Mrs. Kapnison obtained directly from him during the course of
their marriage," l4 Judge Barrett accepted the admissibility of the testi-
mony relying not on the "modified" unilateral marital privilege, but
rather because Mrs. Kapnison qualified as a participant under the
"crime-fraud" exception to the marital privilege. The "crime-fraud" ex-
ception operates to negate the marital privilege when a husband and
wife conspire or otherwise actively participate in an unlawful activity. "15
The theory behind this exception is that marital communications having
to do with the commission of a crime do not concern the marriage itself
and therefore do not fall within the protections of the marital privilege.
Because Mrs. Kapnison acknowledged that she was an active participant
in an unlawful scheme, 1 6 Mr. Kapnison's allegation that his wife's testi-
mony was in violation of confidential marital communications was with-
out merit." 17
111. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
112. Kapnison, 743 F.2d at 1454 (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53
(1980)).
113. Kapnison, 743 F.2d at 1454.
114. Judge Barrett noted that there must be strict enforcement of the lower court's
ruling that Mrs. Kapnison's testimony be limited to those statements made by Mr.
Kapnison to Mrs. Kapnison in the presence of other persons, or testimony relating to acts




117. Id. at 1454.
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In another opinion, United States v. Neal," 8 handed down on the
same day as Kapnison, the Tenth Circuit attempted to more clearly define
the application of a "modified" marital privilege to a case that also in-
volved the "crime-fraud" exception. Mrs. Neal was an accessory after
the fact to a robbery and murder allegedly committed by her husband.
Similar to the facts in Kapnison, Mrs. Neal was granted immunity from
prosecution in exchange for truthful testimony pertaining to her hus-
band's suspected criminal activity. Mr. Neal appealed the district court's
decision and contended that the court erred in allowing Mrs. Neal to
testify about communicative acts in contravention of the marital
privilege. 1"9
Judge Barrett first pointed out that because Mrs. Neal was an acces-
sory after the fact to a robbery committed by her husband, Mr. Neal
could not cling to the cloak of marital immunity when his wife, who en-
joyed the fruits of the crime, gave incriminating testimony under a grant
of immunity. Second, Judge Barrett described the now applicable
"modified" marital immunity that permits the witness-spouse to testify
against his or her spouse without that spouse's approval. "[W]e con-
clude that the existing rule should be modified so that the witness-
spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness
may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying."'
120
In the Neal decision, Judge Barrett defined the applicability of this
"modified" privilege rule, and cleared up obscurities that were not ad-
dressed in the Kapnison decision. This modified rule, he explained, op-
erates to exclude the testimony of one spouse against another only when
the "sole knowledge and information and/or participation involves a con-
versation wherein the spouse who committed the crime discloses that fact to the other
spouse.' 12 1 In the Neal case, however, Mrs. Neal actively participated in
the cover-up of her husband's crime and enjoyed the fruits of his crimi-
nal activity; thus, the "crime-fraud" exception to the marital communi-
cations privilege was applied rather than the "modified" privilege rule.
Because Mrs. Neal was an accessory after the fact in her husband's
crime, the Tenth Circuit upheld the lower court's admission of her testi-
mony concerning the crime.
2. Immunity and Waiver of the Right to Remain Silent
When immunity is granted to a witness, the witness waives his or
her right to invoke the fifth amendment right to silence. The grant of
"transactional" immunity has two limitations on it not present in a gen-
eral grant of immunity. First, transactional immunity does not preclude
a subsequent prosecution for perjury based on the immunized testi-
mony. Second, transactional immunity does not extend to matters not
related to the elicited testimony. Thus, a witness cannot gain immunity
118. 743 F.2d 1441 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1848 (1985).
119. Neal, 743 F.2d at 1444.
120. Id. at 1445 (emphasis omitted).
121. Id. at 1446 (emphasis by the court).
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from all prosecution for all previous criminal acts by simply including a
reference to those acts in his testimony without regard to the subject on
which he was asked to testify.122
In Wolffv. United States, 123 a witness accepted an offer of immunity in
exchange for giving incriminating testimony against the defendant,
Wolff. In a later habeus corpus proceeding, Wolff alleged that the im-
munized witness committed perjury while on the stand and that the gov-
ernment knowingly used this perjured testimony against him.
Furthermore, he claimed that his confrontational and due process rights
were violated when this critical witness was granted immunity. 124 The
government took the position that the immunity granted to the witness
was "transactional" and therefore the witness was subject to prosecution
for perjury for his proferred testimony. Wolff, however, contended that
the immunity was much broader and that the witness was exempt from
prosecution for perjury. Therefore, Wolff argued, the oath the witness
had to take before testifying was destroyed, and his due process and
confrontational rights were violated.12 5
Without addressing the distinctions between "transactional" and
"non-transactional" immunity, the court, Judge McWilliams writing,
simply stated that the immunity granted the witness did not specifically
include or exclude the witness' immunity from perjury. Because counsel
for the defense knew the underlying basis of immunity and had failed to
either make an appropriate objection at trial or determine the exact ex-
tent and effect of the immunity granted, the court held that the defend-
ant was barred from raising the immunity issue on appeal. 12 6 The court
mentioned that if the defendant could have shown good cause for not
having raised this issue at the trial level and have further shown that
there was actual prejudice resulting from this error, appellate relief
might have been available. The defense counsel was unable to demon-
strate either, and the defendant was left without means for relief.
In United States v. Hembree, 12 7 the issue of perjury with respect to
immunized testimony arose again. The Tenth Circuit again did not ad-
dress "transactional" or "non-transactional" immunity; rather, it de-
scribed the grant of immunity to be one that was given in exchange for
truthful testimony. The immunized witness, Hembree, testified at trial
that she had lied to the grand jury. Based on this testimony, Hembree's
probation for an unrelated offense was revoked. She later recanted the
testimony she gave at trial which had implicated the defendant and, as a
result, she was charged and convicted for perjury. On appeal from the
122. See Note, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts In Theory And In Practice: Treading The
Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568, 1578-80 (1963).
123. 737 F.2d 877 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 575 (1984).
124. Id. at 878.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 880. The trial was actually a military proceeding for court martial. The mili-
tary courts have adopted the general rule that appellate courts can only review issues or
errors presented at the lower court level. Id. (citing United States v. Anderson, 10 M.J.
743, 746 (N.C.M.R. 1981) and United States v. Dupuis, 10 M.J. 650, 652 (N.C.M.R. 1980)).
127. 754 F.2d 314 (10th Cir. 1985).
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perjury conviction, Hembree claimed that her immunity rights were vio-
lated or, alternatively, that her fifth amendment rights had been vio-
lated. It was her contention that because the court did not honor her
immunity agreement with the United States Attorney, which had in-
cluded a promise not to participate in probation revocation proceed-
ings, she had given up her right against self-incrimination and received
nothing in return. 1
28
The Tenth Circuit has described the federal immunity statute to be
one that represents an accommodation between the right of the govern-
ment to compel testimony on the one hand, and the constitutional right
to remain silent, on the other.129 The purpose of immunizing a witness
is to reach the truth, and when the testimony cannot be used against the
testifying witness, the fear of incrimination is removed. "The Congres-
sional intent, then, is that the statutory claim of immunity be as broad as,
but no broader than, the privilege against self-incrimination."' 30 The
agreement made between the United States Attorney and the witness
was to exchange the witness' trustworthy testimony for immunity. Be-
cause the witness gave inconsistent testimony and therefore failed to up-
hold her side of the bargain, the Tenth Circuit held that the grant of
immunity was void ab initio.131
It appears that the Tenth Circuit is not concerned with the seman-
tics of "transactional" or "non-transactional" immunity. If a witness is
granted immunity and does not tell the truth when giving testimony, he
or she will be subject to a charge for perjury, and a subsequent claim
that his or her fifth amendment rights or immunity rights have been vio-
lated will not be recognized.
The Hembree court upheld the perjury conviction because the iminu-
nity granted was informal, meaning that no court order, as required by
15 U.S.C. § 6002, was obtained. 13 2 Therefore, the court explained, the
immunity agreement was merely a contract with the United States Attor-
ney that did not bind the district court.' 3 3 Finally, it pointed out that
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies only in
criminal cases, and the law is settled that probation revocation proceed-
ings are not criminal in nature.
13 4
128. Id. at 316.
129. United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1168 (10th Cir. 1978) (citing United
States v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974)).
130. Tramnmei, 583 F.2d at i 168 (citing Childs v. McCord, 420 F. Supp. 428 (D. Md.
1976), afd sub nom. Childs v. Schlitz, 556 F.2d 1178 (4th Cir. 1977)).
131. Hembree, 754 F.2d at 317.
132. See supra note 110.
133. Hembree, 754 F.2d at 317.
134. Id. (citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 104 S. Ct. 1136, 1147 n.7 (1984); Gagnon .
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
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III. SIXTH AMENDMENT
A. Right to Counsel
1. Custodial Interrogation: United States v. Leach
In United States v. Leach,13 5 the defendant, who was convicted on five
counts of passing forged and counterfeited bills, had originally volun-
teered to be interrogated in response to a telephone call from a Secret
Service agent. On appeal, Leach claimed that he was not properly ad-
vised of his Miranda rights informing him of his right to have an attorney
present when being interrogated by police officers. Judge Barrett, writ-
ing for the court, held that because Leach was not in custody and be-
cause he volunteered to be interrogated at the time and place of his
choice, the law enforcement agents were not under a legal duty to advise
him of his Miranda rights. The landmark Miranda case declared that an
individual has a right to be informed of his fifth and sixth amendment
rights once the individual becomes subject to a custodial interrogation.
The Supreme Court, in Rhode Island v. Innis,136 defined "custodial inter-
rogation" to be whenever law enforcement officers deprive an individual
of his freedom and begin to question him. The Court described this
"deprivation of freedom" to include a situation wherein the individual is
placed in an environment where he perceives himself to be subjugated
to the will of the interrogator.' 3 7 Other Supreme Court decisions have
maintained that the constitutional right to an attorney exists only at or
after the time adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against
the defendant, or even as late as when the proceedings are in a "critical
stage."1
38
The Tenth Circuit considered when the right to counsel attaches in
United States v. Bridwell. 139 The Bidwell court, keeping in mind the pre-
requisite of "custody" or "deprivation of freedom," held that when a
physician was questioned in his office and no indicia of coercion is al-
leged, the Miranda warnings were not required. A few years later, in
United States v. Miller,140 the court found no violation of the right to an
advisement of Miranda warnings when a suspect was questioned in his
home prior to his arrest. This finding was based upon the fact that the
defendant was not deprived of his freedom, nor was the questioning co-
ercive in nature.
135. 749 F.2d 592 (10th Cir. 1984).
136. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
137. Id. at 298-99. See generally S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PRO-
CESS 780-832 (3d ed. 1975), 188-202 (Supp. 1979) (discussion and case support for the
right to counsel and when it may be invoked).
138. See, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972) (adversarial judicial proceed-
ings are when the defendant is formally charged at his preliminary hearing, when he is
indicted, or when he is arraigned); accord United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (The
sixth amendment does not guarantee a defendant the right to counsel at a post-indictment
photographic display because this does not constitute a "critical stage" in the judicial pro-
ceedings. A "critical stage" is when the accused requires aid in coping with legal problems
or confronting his adversary.); see also infra note 149 and accompanying text.
139. 583 F.2d 1135 (10th Cir. 1978).
140. 643 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1981).
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Following the precedent set down in these decisions, Judge Barrett
explained in Leach that because the defendant voluntarily spoke to the
two law enforcement agents about his suspected criminal activity, he was
neither coerced nor in any way deprived of his freedom. Consequently,
the court concluded that Leach's sixth amendment rights were not
violated. 14'
2. A Right to the Attorney of Your Choice? - United States v.
McConnell
Criminal defendants have frequently asserted that they are constitu-
tionally entitled to a particular attorney despite the potentially disrup-
tive effect this request may have upon judicial proceedings. In United
States v. McConnell,14 2 the defendant, McConnell, wanted to be repre-
sented by his co-defendant's attorney. 14 3 Because the attorney's dual
representation would have created a conflict of interest, McConnell as-
serted that he was entitled to a severance of his claims. Insisting that
this particular attorney was the only attorney who could effectively rep-
resent him, he contended that his sixth amendment rights would be vio-
lated unless the court granted a trial separate from that of his co-
defendant. The Tenth Circuit, Judge Bohanon writing for the court,
somewhat aghast at this preposterous request, held that the sixth
amendment right to counsel did not extend so far as to entitle a criminal
defendant to a severance merely because he expressed a preference for
an ineligible attorney. 14 4 The court, relying on several earlier Tenth
Circuit cases, 1 4 5 concluded that the sixth amendment does not include
an absolute right to counsel of one's choice. The court stated that
"[t]he right to retain counsel of one's choice 'may not be insisted upon
in a manner that will obstruct an orderly procedure in courts ofjustice,
and deprive such courts of the exercise of their inherent powers to con-
trol the same.' "146
141. The court rejected Leach's argument that because he was a "target of investiga-
tion," he was "in custody" for Miranda purposes. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492,
495 (1977) (Police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone
whom they question; nor are the warnings required simply because the questioning takes
place at the station house or because the questioned person is one whom the police
suspect.).
142. 749 F.2d 1441 (10th Cir. 1984).
143. The McConnell case also discussed the economic requirement necessary in order
for a defendant to be entitled to appointed counsel. Although McConnell contended that
the court did not make the proper inquiry into his financial standing, or advise him that he
need not be indigent to qualify for court-appointed counsel, the court found that it was
incapable of determining such eligibility because McConnell had flatly refused to disclose
his assets and had repeatedly told the trial court that he could afford to hire an attorney.
Id. at 1450.
144. Id. at 1450.
145. United States v. Gipson, 693 F.2d 109 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1216
(1983); United States v. Peister, 631 F.2d 658 (10th Cir. 1980), cerl. denied, 449 U.S. 1126
(1981); United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012
(1980).
146. McConnell, 749 F.2d at 1450 (citing Gipson, 693 F.2d at I I (quoting United States
v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979)).
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3. No Right to Counsel at Post Line-up Interview:
Hallmark v. Cartwright
On appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Oklahoma, the defendant in Hallmark v. Cartwright 147 cited
Richardson v. State, 148 an Oklahoma decision he considered to be control-
ling, and argued that the right to counsel at a line-up should be ex-
tended to include the right to have counsel present at a post line-up
interview between the witnesses and the police. 14 9 The Tenth Circuit
was not persuaded by Richardson and remarked that while a few states
have extended a right to counsel to post line-up interviews,1 5 0 the trend
within the federal courts is not to require the presence of counsel under
such circumstances. 15 1 Accordingly, the per curiam decision stated that
the appellant's sixth amendment rights were not violated when he was
not permitted the presence of counsel at his post line-up interview.
B. Waiver of the Right to Counsel
In order to effectively waive the right to counsel, the Supreme
Court has held that the sixth amendment requires an "intentional relin-
quishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."' 152 In 1980,
the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Weninger,' 53 adopted a test which
requires that before a defendant can relinquish his sixth amendment
right to counsel, the judge must personally address the defendant and
inform him of the nature of the charges made against him, the statutory
offenses included within them, and the range of punishments to which
he may be subjected. The court must also apprise the defendant of the
possible defenses or mitigating factors that might be available to him.154
In United States v. McConnell, 155 another case decided during this sur-
vey period, the Tenth Circuit decided that there was an effective waiver
147. 742 F.2d 584 (10th Cir. 1984).
148. 600 P.2d 361 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
149. A suspect has an absolute right to counsel at any pretrial confrontation. Such
confrontations include, but are not limited to line-ups and one-man show-ups. See United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
150. See People v. Williams, 3 Cal. 3d 853, 478 P.2d 942, 92 Cal. Rptr. 6 (1971) (de-
fendant was entitled to the presence of counsel in a post line-up indentification).
151. The court cited several federal circuit court opinions refusing to extend the right
to counsel to post line-up interviews: United States v. White, 617 F.2d 1131, 1135 (5th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Bierey, 588 F.2d 620, 624 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
927 (1979); United States v. Tolliver, 569 F.2d 724, 727 (2d Cir. 1978) (recording of inter-
view should be made available to defense counsel); United States v. Parker, 549 F.2d 1217,
1223 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 971 (1977); United States v. Wilcox, 507 F.2d 364,
370 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 979 (1975).
152. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387 (1977) (There is a heavy burden on the state to prove that an effective waiver had been
given. To determine this, the courts must look to the circumstances of each case, includ-
ing the defendant's background and the setting in which the alleged waiver took place.).
153. 624 F.2d 163 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980). This test was also
reasserted in United States v. Gipson, 693 F.2d 109 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1216 (1983).
154. 11eninger, 624 F.2d at 164.
155. 749 F.2d 1441 (10th Cir. 1984).
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of counsel despite the trial court's failure to apply the Weninger test. The
court instead looked to the "total circumstances of [the] ... case, includ-
ing background, experience and the conduct of the accused person."1 56
In McConnell the facts revealed that the defendant had attended two and
one half years of law school, that he had read his entire indictment and
asserted that he understood it, that he had already begun to prepare his
defense, and that he was fully aware of the seriousness of the penalty he
faced. 15 7 Furthermore, the trial judge repeatedly attempted to persuade
McConnell to retain an attorney, but the defendant disregarded his ad-
vice. Despite the fact that strict compliance with the Weninger test was
not required to recognize a waiver of an individual's right to counsel in
McConnell, this decision, in view of the particular facts of the case, has
not significantly diminished the importance of a knowing waiver and has
not set the stage for a mere hollow compliance with this revered consti-
tutional mandate in the future. 15 8 The apparent abandonment of the
Weninger requirements in McConnell should not be attributed to a decline
or deterioration of an individual's right to an intelligent and knowing
waiver of his sixth amendment right to counsel.
During the previous survey period, in United States v. Dressel,15 9 the
Tenth Circuit outlined the minimum requirements to find an effective
waiver of counsel in a situation of joint representation. The court de-
clared that the defendant must be made aware of his right to separate
representation if he so desires and he must also understand the hazards
inherent in a case where one attorney is representing two defendants.
Turning to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c), 160 the court fur-
ther noted that the presiding judge should elicit a narrative response
from each defendant stating that he has been advised of his right to an
effective assistance of counsel and that he fully understands the perils of
joint representation and voluntarily and intelligently waives his right to
counsel. 161
156. Id. at 1451 (citing lWeninger, 624 F.2d at 164 (quoting United States v. Warledo,
557 F.2d 721, 727 (10th Cir. 1977)); see also infra note 171 and accompanying text.
157. McConnell, 749 F.2d at 1451.
158. In another case decided during this survey period, United States v. Dressel, 742
F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1984), the court stated: "Notwithstanding the trial court's compli-
ance with all of the suggested procedures to ensure that any waiver is fully informed and
voluntary, under some circumstances 'even full disclosure and consent . . . may not be
adequate protection.' " Id. at 1258 (quoting the advisory committee notes to FED. R.
CRIM. P. 44(c)).
159. 742 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1984).
160. This rule states in relevant part:
Whenever two or more defendants have been jointly charged . . . or have been
joined for trial .... and are represented by the same retained or assigned counsel
or by retained or assigned counsel who are associated in the practice of law, the
court shall promptly inquire with respect to such joint representation and shall
personally advise each defendant of his right to the effective assistance of counsel,
including separate representation ....
FED. R. CRaM. P. 44(c).
161. Dressel, 742 F.2d at 1258 (quoting United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 278 (5th
Cir. 1975)).
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C. Collateral Use of an Uncounseled Conviction
The sixth amendment prohibits collateral use of an invalid uncoun-
seled conviction in order to enhance a subsequent conviction or sen-
tence. This principle has been espoused by the Supreme Court on
numerous occasions, 162 and the Tenth Circuit recently adopted it in
Santillanes v. United States Parole Commission.163 In Santillanes, the trial
court upheld the parole commission's order that Santillanes forfeit his
street time in a revocation of parole hearing due to a state court convic-
tion for driving while intoxicated. Santillanes contended on appeal to
the Tenth Circuit that the forfeiture was constitutionally improper be-
cause the conviction was obtained without the assistance of counsel and
without a waiver of his right to counsel. Judge McKay, writing for the
Tenth Circuit, explained that the proper use of a prior constitutionally
infirm conviction depends on its reliability rather than the mere fact of
conviction; ergo the use of such an invalid prior conviction on one charge
to support a subsequent guilty conviction on another charge, or to en-
hance a later punishment for an unrelated offense, erodes the safeguard
established in Gideon v. Wainright.164 Accordingly, the court could not
accept the use of Santillanes' prior conviction for driving while intoxi-
cated while on parole as a basis for ordering a forfeiture of his "street
time" because the driving while intoxicated conviction had been ob-
tained without the assistance or effective waiver of counsel. 16 5 Under
Santillanes, an uncounseled and therefore constitutionally infirm convic-
tion is per se unreliable.
D. Effective Assistance of Counsel
1. The Requisite Elements of Proof: McGee v. Crist
In McMann v. Richardson, 166 the Supreme Court declared "the right
to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel" in criminal
prosecutions. 167 Last year, in Strickland v. Washington,16 8 the Court set
forth elements that a convicted criminal must prove in order to establish
a denial of the sixth amendment right to counsel. The convicted de-
fendant must persuade the court that his counsel's assistance was so de-
fective as to require a reversal. In order to do so, the defendant must
establish that his counsel's performance was deficient; that is, that the
attorney was not functioning in a manner minimally guaranteed by the
sixth amendment, that standard being guided by reasonableness under
current professional norms. Additionally, the defendant must establish
that the deficient performance actually prejudiced his defense to such a
162. E.g., Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367
(1979); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
163. 754 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1985).
164. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
165. Santillanes, 754 F.2d at 890.
166. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
167. Id. at 771 n.14.
168. 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
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degree that he was not afforded a fair trial. Unless the defendant can
make both of these showings, the conviction will stand.'
69
In the 1980 decision of Dyer v. Crisp, 170 the Tenth Circuit found the
right to effective assistance of counsel to be one that "demands that de-
fense counsel exercise the skill, judgment and diligence of a reasonably
competent defense attorney." 7' Until the Strickland decision came
down in 1984, the Tenth Circuit had only the opaque and highly subjec-
tive standard of Dyer to wrangle with. When the "fair trial doctrine"
approach, with its tangible and more objectively defined elements, was
handed down in Strickland, the Tenth Circuit was given an opportunity
to pull together its somewhat unpredictable and often irreconcilable
holdings. 172 During the current survey period, the Tenth Circuit
adopted the Strickland holding by applying its two-prong test in McGee v.
Crist.17 3 In McGee, the defendant claimed that his sixth amendment right
to effective assistance of counsel was breached, and attempted to estab-
lish both a deficient representation by his attorney and actual prejudice
to his case as required by Strickland. McGee claimed that due to inade-
quate research by his attorney, a key witness who could have testified at
trial and supported his defense did not testify for fear of incriminating
himself. This, alleged McGee, resulted in actual prejudice to his case. 1
74
The Tenth Circuit noted that notwithstanding his attorney's failure
to discover New Mexico's immunity statute, McGee's attorney actually
could not have secured any immunity for the defendant's absent "key"
witness. Under New Mexico law, only the prosecuting attorney may ap-
ply to the court and request a grant of immunity for a witness. 17 5 Be-
cause this request was only available to the state and not to the defense
attorney, McGee was unable to establish the prejudice necessary to find
a denial of effective assistance of counsel as required under Strickland.
2. Multiple Representation: United States v. Burney
In situations where counsel is burdened by a conflict of interest, the
Strickland Court found that a presumption of prejudice arises. 176 The
Supreme Court in Cuyler v. Sullivan 177 qualified this presumption by stat-
ing that it materializes only if the "defendant shows that his counsel ac-
tively represented conflicting interests . . . [and] . . . that an actual
169. Id. at 2064.
170. 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980).
171. Id. at 278.
172. See, e.g., Valdez v. Winans, 738 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Win-
kle, 722 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1983).
173. 739 F.2d 505 (10th Cir. 1984).
174. Id. at 506.
175. Id. at 508. "If a person has been or may be called to testify ... the district court
... may, upon application of the prosecuting attorney, issue an order requiring the person to
testify... notwithstanding his privilege against self-incrimination." N.M.R. CRIM. P. 58(a)
(emphasis added).
176. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. But cf. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482
(1978) (multiple representation of co-defendants is not per se a violation of the sixth
amendment).
177. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
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conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." 178
In a recent Tenth Circuit opinion, United States v. Burney, 17 9 the
court was faced with the issue of whether the sixth amendment imposes
a burden upon the court to initiate an inquiry concerning the potentially
prejudicial effects of multiple representation upon the co-defendant. In
Burney, one attorney represented four defendants and the trial judge did
not make any inquiry into the effect this had on the adequacy of repre-
sentation afforded to each defendant. It is noteworthy, however, that
the attorney did not bring this potential conflict to the attention of the
trial judge.' 8 0 This fact was critical in the protection of the defendants'
right to effective assistance of counsel. The Burney court, Judge Sey-
mour writing, cited Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c), 18 1
although it appeared to pay the rule no regard. Judge Seymour ac-
knowledged that an attorney conflict of interest implicates the sixth
amendment; nevertheless, she cited three circuit opinions and one
United States Supreme Court opinion 18 2 as authority for the principle
that the sixth amendment "does not require a court to initiate an inquiry
when no party either objects to multiple representation or raises a con-
flict issue."1 83 Because the Burney court decided that no violation of the
sixth amendment occurs when neither the court nor any party raises an
objection at trial to multiple representation, the defendant must demon-
strate to the court that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his
lawyer's performance as required by Strickland.184 Burney failed to
demonstrate any such conflict. A trial court's failure to comply with
Rule 44(c) will not ipsofacto justify a reversal of a conviction; a defendant
must show that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests.1
8 5
E. Police Interrogation Following a Defendant's Invocation of His Right to
Counsel
In 1981, the United States Supreme Court announced that all police
interrogation must stop once the accused has expressed his desire to
deal with the police only in the presence of his attorney. 186 It is not
until the accused is furnished with an attorney or until the accused initi-
ates further communications, exchanges or conversations with the of-
178. Id. at 350.
179. 756 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1985).
180. Id. at 791.
181. See supra note 157.
182. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346 (1980); United States v. Unger, 700 F.2d
445,453 n.17 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 339 (1983); United States v. Benavidez, 664
F.2d 1255, 1258 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982). Cf. United States v. Foster,
469 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1972).
183. Burney, 756 F.2d at 791.
184. Id. (citing Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50).
185. Id. The court also cited United States v. Alvarez, 696 F.2d 1307, 1309 (11 th Cir.),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 907 (1983); United States v. Arias, 678 F.2d 1202, 1205 (4th Cir.), cert.
deniedsub nom. Faircloth v. United States, 459 U.S. 910 (1982); and Benavid, 664 F.2d at
1258-59, for its authority in this decision.




ficers that the officers may begin to question the criminal suspect. 18 7 In
United States v. De La Luz Gallegos," 8 the Tenth Circuit recognized this
limitation on police communications, but refused to find any sixth
amendment violation. In De La Luz Gallegos, the defendant was advised
of his Miranda rights when he was approached by an agent of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs concerning a gunshot incident the previous day. He
indicated that he understood his rights and requested an attorney.
Then De La Luz Gallegos made some statements tending to show that
he was in possession of the shotgun involved. Judge Cook,' 8 9 writing
for the Tenth Circuit, explained that although De La Luz Gallegos had
invoked his right to counsel, he subsequently made spontaneous decla-
rations; his statements were plainly volunteered and unprovoked. The
law enforcement officer had scrupulously honored the defendant's re-
quest for an attorney, and even went so far as to advise him to keep
silent until his attorney arrived. Because the defendant ignored this ad-
vice and initiated further conversation with the police officers, the court
could find no violation of the defendant's sixth amendment rights.' 9 0
De La Luz Gallegos additionally asserted that the prosecution acted
improperly when it commented to the jury in its opening statement that
the defendant had requested an attorney upon his arrest. Though com-
ment to a jury on an individual's invocation of his right to keep silent
under the fifth amendment may constitute error,' 9 ' the Tenth Circuit
held that any reference to a defendant's request for an attorney is
proper and relevant for the purpose of laying a foundation for the ad-
mission of any subsequent statements made by the defendant. 19 2 This is
so the jury can determine whether or not the defendant's subsequent
statements were voluntary and what weight they should be accorded. 1
93
F. The Confrontation Clause
In conducting a criminal trial, the court must protect the rights of
the defendant under the sixth amendment, including the defendant's
right to confront the witnesses who provide evidence or testimony
against him.19 4 During this survey period, the Tenth Circuit considered
several cases that illustrate the nature and scope of this clause in various
contexts. 195
187. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.
188. 738 F.2d 378 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 574 (1984).
189. Judge Cook, Chief United States District Judge for the Northern District of
Oklahoma, sat by designation.
190. De La Luz Galegos, 738 F.2d at 381. See also United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d
1371, 1380-81 (10th Cir. 1984) (Because the defendant initiated further dialogue with the
police officer after he had requested to see an attorney, the court held the defendant's
sixth amendment right to counsel was not violated when the police continued further dis-
cussion with him.).
191. See supra notes 94-108 and accompanying text.
192. De La Luz Galtegos, 738 F.2d at 381 (citing United States v. Wycoff, 545 F.2d 679,
681 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1105 (1977)).
193. Id. at 381-82.
194. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
195. For a general discussion of the right to confront witnesses, see F. MILLER, R. DAW-
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1. A Limited Examination: United States v. Morgan
United States v. Morgan 196 is helpful in that it sets forth the rights
implicit in the sixth amendment's confrontation clause. In Morgan, the
defendant claimed that his rights under the confrontation clause were
violated because the trial court granted a motion limiting the defense
counsel's examination of a government's witness. The court had di-
rected defense counsel to refrain from asking questions about the wit-
ness's pending murder charges and those to which the witness could
invoke the fifth amendment.
Before addressing the relevant requirements to Morgan, the Tenth
Circuit, Judge Saffels 19 7 writing, listed the rights implicitly contained in
the confrontation clause. First, the confrontation clause limits the pros-
ecution's use of hearsay evidence. Before any hearsay can be raised in
court against the accused, there must be sufficient "indicia of reliability
as to the statement."' 98 The prosecution must demonstrate the unavail-
ability of the declarant and establish that it has made a good faith effort
to obtain the declarant at trial.' 9 9 If at all possible, the defendant must
be given an opportunity to cross examine the government's witness.
20 0
Second, the confrontation clause does not provide the accused with a
guarantee that the government must call each and every witness it has to
testify against him.20 1 The accused generally does not have the right to
confront an informant who does not provide any evidence at trial. 20 2
Finally, the court spoke to the relevant issue in Morgan and recognized a
third element of the confrontation clause: the accused has a right to use
cross-examination as a way to present a defense to the charges brought
against him.
20 3
SON, G. Dix, R. PARTNAS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 1253, 1288 (4th ed. 1976),
244 (Supp. 1979).
196. 757 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir. 1985).
197. Judge Saffels, United States District Judge for the District of Kansas, sat by
designation.
198. Morgan, 757 F.2d at 1076 (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)).
199. Id. (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968)); see also Mancusi v. Stubbs,
408 U.S. 204 (1972) (A showing that the witness is outside of the the country is sufficient
per se to establish "unavailability" and avoid the requirement that the prosecution make a
good faith effort.).
200. Morgan, 757 F.2d at 1076 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970)); see,
e.g., United States v. Kapnison, 743 F.2d 1450, 1458-59 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 2017 (1985). In Kapnison, the defendant attempted to admit a deposition of a declarant
that was taken in a previous civil action, claiming that it had an adequate indicia of reliabil-
ity because the deponent was cross-examined by other parties during the deposition. The
Tenth Circuit refused to allow the admission of this testimony in view of the fact that the
government did not have the opportunity to cross examine the deponent during this civil
action.
201. Morgan, 757 F.2d at 1076 (citing Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 n.2 (1967)).
202. Id. (citing United States v. Francesco, 725 F.2d 817, 822 (1st Cir. 1984); United
States v. Kabbaby, 672 F.2d 857, 864 (11th Cir. 1982); United States ex rel. Meadows v.
New York, 426 F.2d 1176, 1184 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 941 (1971)).
203. Id. (citing Younger, Confrontation, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 28 (1984)); see also United
States v. Swingler, 758 F.2d 477, 497 (10th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he sixth amendment confron-
tation clause ... [gives the defendant] the right [to an] 'effective' cross examination when




In most instances, the prosecution calls its informant to the stand to
testify against the accused, but in Morgan it did not. Because the defense
wanted to prove that the informant coerced the defendant into selling
cocaine, it called the informant to the stand as a hostile witness. 20 4 The
Tenth Circuit cited language in the Supreme Court case of Chambers v.
Mississippi 20 5 which stated that "[t]he right of confrontation does not de-
pend upon whether the witness was put on the stand by the accused or
by the prosecution." '20 6 However, when Morgan's counsel asked the in-
formant about his own involvement in criminal activity, the informant
invoked the fifth amendment. In allowing a limitation on questions
asked by the defense to which the informant could invoke this privilege,
the court stated that the trial court had adequately balanced all compet-
ing interests and did not abuse its discretion in limiting the informant's
testimony. 20 7  Thus Morgan was not denied his right of con-
frontation.
20 8
2. Unavailable Witness and Reliable Information:
Ewing v. Winans
In Ewing v. Winans,20 9 the accused, Ewing, appealed the trial court's
decision to allow the prosecution to read portions of Ewing's girlfriend's
deposition to the jury and further allowing the prosecution to read the
entire deposition into the record. Under the New Mexico Rules of Evi-
dence, any part or all of a deposition may be used as evidence if the
declarant is unavailable. 2 10 The statute further states that a witness is
unavailable if the proponent of the statement is unable to procure the
declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable means. 2 1 1 When
deciding whether reasonable means were taken to secure the attendance
of the witness at trial, the courts look to the totality of the circum-
stances. 2 12 Under the New Mexico rules, the Tenth Circuit, Judge Bar-
rett writing, found that the trial court did not err in allowing the
deposition to be read into the record and to be read to thejury.2 13 The
record clearly showed that she was an uncooperative witness. 2 14
204. Morgan, 757 F.2d at 1075. The prosecution apparently did not object to an ele-
ment of the confrontation clause as discussed by the Tenth Circuit in this case: "[T]he
accused generally may not confront an informant who provides no evidence at trial." See
supra note 202 and accompanying text.
205. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
206. Morgan, 757 F.2d at 1077 (citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 298).
207. Id. The court noted that the questions which the defense wished to ask the in-
formant involved matters collateral to the issues at trial and, additionally, other evidence
was introduced to accomplish the same purpose as such testimony would have accom-
plished. Id.
208. Accord United States v. Ramirez, 622 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1980).
209. 749 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1984).
210. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 8 04(a) (1983).
211. Id. at § 804(a)(5) (1983). See also State v. Vialpando, 93 N.M. 289, 599 P.2d 1086
(state has burden to prove the unavailability of its witnesses), cert. denied, 93 N.M. 172, 598
P.2d 215 (1979).
212. Vialpando, 599 P.2d at 1092.
213. Ewing, 749 F.2d at 611.
214. Id. at 610-11. The facts clearly established that the investigator had considerable
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In addition to satisfying the procedural rules of evidence, the trial
court must ensure that the defendant's constitutional right to confront
the witness is protected. To determine whether this was done, the
Tenth Circuit relied on the guidelines set forth in Ohio v. Roberts.
2 15 If
the prosecution wishes to admit a deposition into the record or read
passages of it to the jury, first it must either produce the declarant at
trial, or sufficiently demonstrate to the court that the declarant is un-
available. 2 16 Second, it must establish that the deposition is trustworthy
and reliable. 21 7 The Tenth Circuit found that the prosecution had suffi-
ciently established the unavailability of the declarant when it satisfied
the requirements under the New Mexico Rules of Evidence.
The defendant, however, contended that the deposition was inad-
missible because it lacked the trustworthiness required by the confronta-
tion clause of the sixth amendment. The court was not persuaded.
When the witness appeared at the grand jury and at her deposition, she
was represented by counsel. She was examined and cross-examined
under oath. In addition, there were no significant or material inconsis-
tencies among her statements, her testimony at the grand jury, and her
testimony at her deposition. The Ewing court accordingly held that the
reliability requirement was satisfied and concluded that the defendant
was not deprived of his right to confront his witness. The right to con-
front a witness, in short, cannot be equated to a right to cross
examine.
2 18
3. The Co-conspirator Hearsay Exception
a. United States v. Shepherd
When a hearsay declarant is not available for trial, the confrontation
clause requires, as stated above, a sufficient showing of unavailability of
the witness, and reliability of the statements. In United States v. Shep-
herd,2 19 the defendant appealed from his convictions for conspiracy to
transport explosives in interstate commerce. The government had
based its case on testimony of a federally protected witness who had
conspired with the defendant. The Tenth Circuit allowed admission of
the protected witness's testimony as to out-of-court statements. Judge
Logan found the statements were not hearsay in that they were not of-
fered for the truth of the matter asserted, rather they were offered to
prove that the statements were in fact made, thereby showing the exist-
ence of a conspiracy. Because the court found, based on the record, that
difficulty in serving the witness for her grand jury appearance and for her deposition;
moreover, she had refused to come to the district attorney's office to discuss the case and
had moved from her previous address without notifying the officials.
215. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). See also United States v. Rothbart, 653 F.2d 462, 465-66 (10th
Cir. 1981).
216. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 (citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972); Barber
v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968)).
217. Ewing, 749 F.2d at 612 (citing Synder v Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934)).
218. Id. at 613.
219. 739 F.2d 510 (10th Cir. 1984).
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the jury had ample opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the defend-
ant, it held there was no violation of the confrontation clause.2 20 The
court did not engage in a discussion of the trustworthiness of the absent
declarant's statements; rather, it seemed satisfied that because one of
the co-conspirators, the defendant, was present at trial, there was an op-
portunity to test the reliability of the statement through cross-examina-
tion of the present co-defendant.
b. United States v. Alfonso
The court was more articulate in discussing the confrontational
rights with respect to the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule in
United States v. Alfonso. 22 1 In Alfonso, the court, in a per curiam opinion,
stated "[i]t is true that 'testimony which . . .hurdle[s] the hearsay rule
via an exception can still run afoul of the Sixth Amendement.' ,,222
Here, the confrontation clause violation had been objected to at trial,
unlike Shepherd, and the Tenth Circuit was willing to specifically address
the issue. Because there was a substantial showing of truthfulness in
addition to compliance with the hearsay rule, the court held that the
defendant's sixth amendment rights had not been breached.
22 3
In Alfonso, the defendant objected at trial to the admission of state-
ments made by a co-conspirator outside the defendant's presence. In-
cluded was the co-conspirator's statement to an undercover officer that
the defendant, Alfonso, was his partner in a cocaine distribution con-
spiracy. Relying on guidelines set forth in several Supreme Court cases,
the Tenth Circuit found an adequate "indicia of reliability" which justi-
fied the admission of the co-conspirator's statements although he was
not confronted by Alfonso at trial.2 24 First, the prosecution established
that the out-of-court declarant knew the identity and role of the other
conspirator. Second, the court was persuaded that the declarant's state-
ments were not based on faulty recollections, or that such a possibility
was extremely remote. Third, the court found that the declarant's state-
ments tended to incriminate himself; that is, they tended to be state-
ments made against his own interest. Fourth, the statements were not
ambiguous. Finally, these hearsay statements were not critical to the
government's case. 2 25 Because the prosecution was able to establish
these five things, the Tenth Circuit was convinced that there was in fact a
sufficient "indicia of reliability" to justify the admission of the hearsay
statements by the co-conspirator. 22 6
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220. Shepherd, 739 F.2d at 514.
221. 738 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1984).
222. Atfonso, 738 F.2d at 372 (quoting United States v. Roberts, 583 F.2d 1173, 1177
(10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1080 (1979)).
223. Atfonso, 738 F.2d at 372.
224. See Green, 399 U.S. at 161-62; Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88-89; see also Roberts, 583 F.2d at
1176.
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